Trumples represent any material thing desired by mankind universally. The closest approximation would be money.
Trylicans are severely handicapped monsters dependent on routine and resistant to change.
They always walk in the same direction instinctively. They have specialized skills that allow them to survive by working together. They cooperate out of necessity using the virtual limits of their abilities. John Stuart Mill, the utilitarian thinker says the following of individuals who might be described as "Trylican-like."
"He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation." -John Stuart MillTrylicans live perfectly happy lives by depending on routine, tradition, and imitation.
The manner in which the tribe attains the trumples is most definitely utilitarian. First, the Tweeble (the big hopping eye) kidnaps a Twarfer (the walking mouth) and binds him to a tree without his consent. This is a violation of the Twarfer's individual rights. The twarfer responds by twarfing (i.e. screaming). His screams do not fall on deaf ears...
Trollephants (walking ears with arms) are listening. They hear the twarfing and know that Twarfers twarf when they are tied to trumple trees. They are not tall enough to reach the trumples themselves, so they find a Titan (probably by listening for its footsteps) and push the Titan toward the twarfing. The Titan "taps the trunk," and "trumples topple for all the tribe."
In this way, they get quite a lot of utility by binding the Twarfer against his will, depriving him of what some consider his inalienable right to liberty. This makes the Twarfer a slave for the good of the whole. Yet, the tribe could not attain trumples without his twarfing, and compensates for the injustice by feeding (paying) the Twarfer bits of trumple.
Let's discuss whether the Tweeble's actions are justified. First, remember, the Tweeble himself is not free. His (and the tribe's) dependence on the tradition of violating the Twarfer's rights had purpose. It is required to acquire trumples. The Tweeble might argue he was bound to the obligation to tie the Twarfer as much as the Twarfer was bound to the obligation to be tied.
What's the difference? The Twarfer had no choice in the matter. The Tweeble's choice is to tie the Twarfer or do nothing and die of starvation as a result, along with the other Trylicans. Do the ends justify the means?
John Stuart Mill thinks so. Mill believes that not only is the Tweeble justified to tie up the Twarfer, but that he has a moral obligation to do so.
"A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury." -John Stuart MillMill believes the Tweeble would be accountable for the Twarfer's starvation if he did not take action and tie him to the tree. Mill believes the Twarfer's rights are secondary, and the trumply consequences are primary, more than justifying the violation of rights.
Immanuel Kant disagrees with Mill...
"In law a man is guilty when he violates the rights of others. In ethics he is guilty if he only thinks of doing so." Immanuel KantFor Kant, there is no question the Tweeble would be guilty by law. And, in ethics, the Tweeble would possibly be guilty.
What makes the Tweeble guilty?
He is ethically guilty if he thinks of violating the rights of the Twarfer.
But, remember, Trylicans depend on routine, tradition, and imitation. The Tweeble is not guilty, ethically, if he acts without thinking...in other words, if he acts according to tradition or imitation alone, and is truly unaware of the violation.
Thoughtless adherence to tradition, for Kant, provides somewhat of an ethical safety bubble. Provided one remains in a state of ignorance, utilizing nothing more than their faculty of imitation, they cannot be held ethically accountable. (A blind person cannot be held accountable for committing a crime that requires sight. Manslaughter, if completely incidental and unintentional, is morally neutral).
What if the Tweeble recognizes the ethical problem with his actions? Does he have a practical incentive to change his behavior? No, he has only disincentive. To change his behavior would be a confession of guilt, as his life had been devoted to the abhorrent practice of tying Twarfers. Furthermore, if he is capable of understanding the rights violation, he is also capable of understanding the conditions of his innocence: The answer to the question: "why did you do that?" - no matter how heinous - can always be answered: "because that is the way it has always been done." His simple innocence is plausible.
This is a powerful incentive not to think too much. It is, in fact, much more than that. It is an incentive to arrange one's life so that nothing must be done that has never been done before - to live according to precedence rather than reason. Living in a state of perpetual, thoughtless routine would require unchanging conditions like those the Trylicans enjoyed for their entire experience on Triangle Top. The benefits are profound. This is a recipe for peace, justice, blamelessness, and mutual reward. One might reasonably argue there is a moral obligation to bind one's sense of duty to proven traditions and routine over dangerous and unnecessary new experiences in order to preserve a state of moral purity unattainable any other way.
Conditions, however, are subject to change...
Travis is just like all the other Tweebles, with one exception. He happens to be the first one to identify the cliff (troubling terrain) over which the entire tribe is about to tumble.
He is suddenly, for the first time, unable to appeal to tradition. He observes the physical properties of the cliff and the direction of the tribe's advance. Through reason, which he cannot ignore or deny, he is necessarily bound to the reality that tribe's adherence to tradition will send them tumbling to their deaths. His former rule, that of not thinking, will no longer protect him. He is suddenly compelled to action, which would be justified by two moral theories that are often in conflict:
- Deontological (Kant): Based on the action's adherence to duty, recognizing individuals never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.
- Consequential (Mill): Based on action that produces a good outcome, or consequence, recognizing individuals as a means to the greatest good for the greatest number.
Travis' duty is to "turn the tribe from total termination" if he is able. Rescuing the tribe is likely something Kant would consider congruent with the categorical imperative.
"A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to any other purpose." -KantBut, the Categorical Imperitive has more conditions. Travis must:
"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." -Kant (If another Tweeble saw this, they ought to do the same.)And...
"Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end." -Kant (Respect the rights of every Trylican, treating them always as ends, and not killing-off any for the good of the whole).And...
"Every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends." -KantBasically, Travis must do everything he is capable of doing to rescue each individual in the tribe out of reverence to duty and for no other reason. He also must do so as if his every action, in his circumstance, he would will to be universal law. And, he must do so with regard for the rights of every Trylican. Tough gig.
Consequential Reasoning
The greatest good for the greatest number depends on Travis doing something. (See Mill's earlier quote on inaction). Travis must prevent great harm, and is quite justified by the harm principle in acting:
"The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant." -MillSince every member of the tribe is doing harm to one another, and they can be prevented from doing more harm, Travis has "sufficient warrant" to exercise power over any individual in the tribe against his will.
Incidentally, the former Travis, who was bound to tradition and imitation, has now converted to a thinking creature, which Mill respects and encourages...
"He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision." -MillWhile one might argue that Travis is obligated to use his faculties, he does choose his plan for himself. Like his earlier choice to continue tying Twarfers after recognizing the violation, he once again chooses against the suicidal option to do nothing. He does have a purely selfish utilitarian justification, as he cannot get trumples without at least one Twarfer, one Trollephant, and one Titan. His own life is also at stake here as it was before.
But, telling the tribe anything is taxing for a Tweeble. Travis, in desperation, ties a Twarfer to a Titan. He is unfamiliar with the responsibility of new knowledge, and ill-prepared to act according to reason. His purpose is communication. He wishes to "transmit the tale" of the tribe's tumultuous trajectory.
He courageously acts, but learns he not only lacks the mouth to communicate, but that the Titan has no way of perceiving the message he is attempting to transmit. He essentially discovers that effective communication with the Titan is not possible. He learns the benefit of trial and error; that we learn from failure.
This action has significance. Since this act does not have precedence, Travis acts outside of the safety bubble of tradition entirely, and thus unequivocally violates the Twarfer's rights intentionally. According to Kant, this action is certainly a moral crime. It would be a crime according the law as well.
Mill also seems to reject the moral worth of this action, since its consequences seem not to be helping.
It seems that we have agreement here: Tying the Twarfer to the Titan was not the right thing to do...
The chaos of the entanglement demonstrates the shock and confusion of many traditional beings simultaneously being exposed to something different. Anything other than tradition, for a Trylican, is a dangerous force separating them from their treasured trumples. They instinctively clump together, expecting, in vain, to acquire trumples from one another. The productivity and advancement of the tribe is slowed. (The slowing down the tribe was a detail that had to be cut from the text of the printed book.)
Those who interpret the story as espousing only the merits of cooperation did not observe how misled cooperation motivated them to participate in the fruitless pursuit of extracting trumples from each other in a senseless mob. The simple message, "cooperation is good," is also contrary to Travis' next heroic individual effort of dragging a Twarfer to a distant trumple tree...
Realizing he has no means to communicate with the tribe directly, he thinks of an original plan to rescue them. He aims to turn the tribe by using faculties that other members of the tribe actually do possess. He aims to produce twarfing from a trumple tree far away from the cliff. He hopes the twarfing will attract the attention of the Trollephants who will push Titans away from the cliff, thus turning the trajectory of the tribe.
Travis has learned that all original actions must be justified by reason; without precedence, they are not only morally suspect, but potentially disastrous. Reason demands that he respect certain conditions in order to effectively execute his plan. He must act according to the tradition/law/precedence (even if the law is corrupt). He knows that the consequence of rescuing the tribe by acting contrary to tradition would have the effect of justifying action other than acquiring trumples. The tribe depends on acquiring trumples for its sustenance, and also depends on imitation and tradition. Whatever Travis does, he suspects it will be imitated. As a Tweeble, he has only one choice. He must turn the tribe by tying Twarfers to trumple trees. There can be no alternative but death.
This is the first time in the story any Trylican does anything autonomously, that could be sincerely willed to be universal law, and treats others also as ends in themselves. According to Kant, Travis' trek to the distant trumple is the first truly moral act perpetuated by any Trylican.
Travis' course of action is also a moral act according to Mill, assuming rescuing the tribe is an end worth pursuing, and passes the test of whether the means justify it:
"All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient. When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained it." -Mill UtilitarianismTravis uses imitation to his advantage. Since his actions are consistent with the tradition of tying Twarers, other Tweebles (those not paralyzed with despair) are comfortable coming to his aid. There is a possibility the imitating Tweebles comprehend the significance, and if so, could be acting morally as well.
Despair takes hold of Tweebles as they tie the twarfers. They cry, causing a great big mess.
Neither Mill nor Kant make a case that crying is an indication of moral worth. Folks are regularly affected to tears for trivialities, vain reasons, or possibly no reason whatsoever. (Of course, for the gravest reasons as well). I added this based on my observation that crying in the face of danger adds to despair, making conditions more hopeless, which adds to more tears. The self-destructive cycle is tragic, harmful, and universal (as we are all susceptible to it). However, to the degree it is a necessary end in itself, and with respect to empathy and emotion that would be willed to be universal law under the circumstances, I do not reject the possibility it is sometimes a categorical imperative. If the flood is interpreted this way, I would not object.
Now the plot thickens. The tribe dangles over the side of the cliff. The action that was previously immoral on both accounts (the tying of Tweebles to Titans) has the consequence of preserving the lives of many Trylicans.
The tears burst over the side in a waterfall, draining the flood, which allows the Tweebles to continue effectively tying Twarfers. Both of these events are completely unintended, incidental, consequences of Travis' plan.
For fun, Trylicans who had been expecting trumples are suddenly bewildered by their unfamiliar condition.
What is unfolding is a series of events that could not have been planned or predicted. Finally, after a tumultuous effort, one Trollephant finally hears the Twarfing and pushes one Titan toward Travis' Tweebles.
The Trollephant is acting according to tradition, but happens to be doing the right thing. Is the moral worth of his action dependent upon whether he can comprehend the nature of the events surrounding him correctly? Is this necessary for the Trollephant's action to have moral worth? We know that it is not enough that the act is consistent with duty, and that it must be carried out in the name of fulfilling a duty. But, he may have sincerely believed that he was fulfilling his duty while getting trumples for the tribe before, even as he was pushing them over a cliff. This suggests that in order for an action to have moral worth, it must be in the name of fulfilling the primary duty (rather than a means to something else), and comprehending the reasons, means, and possible ends for such duty, along with the alternatives. It suggests that reason, thought, and consciousness are required for morality. This contradicts the earlier claim, that thoughtlessness and "binding one's sense of duty to proven traditions and routine...[is necessary to]...preserving a state of moral purity."
Kant calls actions that are means to some end hypothetical imperatives. Therefore, anything done as a means to something else, even actions that aid in turning the tribe from total termination, are hypothetical imperatives that can be judged by their consequences. An action consistent with the categorical imperative is necessary and regarded as an end in itself and not merely a means; it has moral worth regardless of its consequences.
Despite the efforts of the Trollephants and Tweebles to retract the dangling tribe, the "Titans thrashed terribly" and "tens of Trylicans tumbled into the trough of tears below." This is an unintended consequence. Even the best efforts of the Tweebles, Trollephants, and Twarfers couldn't stop the helpless, dangling Titans from excusing themselves and their companions from the safety of the tribe. They act without precedence and not according to reason, but, in this case, panic and fear. They fall into the trough of tears that providence has provided them, incidental to the Trylicans' efforts. The torrent of tears happened to save the unfortunate Trylicans from death.
Remaining Trylicans are pulled to safety, and the tribe toddles toward tremendous tracts of trumples beyond.
The consequence of this tragedy is the loss of some Trylicans into the trough of tears below, and the turning of the tribe away from the cliff. The concluding text points out that "since telling tales was not tradition, all Trylican truths trickled into twilight, never to be twarfed again." In other words, when they eventually reach the cliff on the other side of the Triangle Top, they will probably suffer the same fate because they had not recorded and learned from history. (Tradition does have merit when fused with reason, and learning from history is arguably the most meritorious tradition humans have).
There is significance to the fact that "Travis was tossed into the trough of tears" (although, this is a bit esoteric). The individual who acts according to reason and opposes a popular tradition is an outlaw, and accepts full accountability for the results of their actions (good or bad, they cannot appeal to precedence). The Tweebles' way-of-life is challenged by Travis. Therefore, Travis is tossed into the trough (presumably by the other Tweebles). One could suspect the reasoning for this is utilitarian and two-fold, with one reason exposed and the other secret:
- The exposed reason is that Tweebles need trumple, and generally believe it cannot be acquired without tying Twarfers. Travis' act of tying Twarfers to Titans is contrary to their goals (generally) and not to be imitated in the future. While not exactly a crime, they use this as a scape goat to punish him as an example to the others in order to preserve their trumple-acquiring tradition.
- Secretly, they are also threatened by this "tenacious Tweeble" who thinks autonomously. They know they kidnap and assault Twarfers in order to acquire trumples. They fear they will starve without doing so. Yet, rather than defending these actions as necessary, they opt to toss Travis into the trough.
While the story had to be ended somewhere (and it's already complicated enough for children), there are finer points that could have rounded-out the message. Given more pages, I might have indicated that all the Tweebles contributed to the tossing of Travis. While any tradition that depends on murder is suspect, the unanimous agreement to toss Travis completely invalidates the last remaining justification for the Tweebles' way-of-life. Their last hope of justification was appealing to the blind, innocent, 'ape-like' imitation that prompted Tweebles to tie Twarfers. Yet, any innocent, imitating Tweeble would certainly not suddenly break tradition to participate in murder. This reveals that Tweebles are not thoughtless, and not dependent entirely upon imitation, but certainly capable of thinking for themselves. As such, if they do think for themselves, and prefer to kill rather than allow their traditions to be subject to scrutiny, they must not believe their traditions are justified.
This scenario should have saved the Tweebles and Twarfers the trouble and allowed them to have a greater sense of trust with one another (proving that, indeed, all Tweebles think). It should have dispelled the fallacy that Tryicans were bound to imitation and lacked reason. It should have been a profound reason to expect wonderful things from fellow Trylicans and emancipated the Twarfers.
Alas, they are Trylicans, not humans, and live in a depraved state of knowing, reasoning, but not having the faculty of communication. Therefore, they will be bound to their hopeless condition forever, only recognizing the fact that the others have reason upon facing calamity.
The story is essentially a critique of strict, traditional fundamentalism and moral absolutism, and I am always happy to discuss it further. Thanks for reading! -Mark
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